DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-26-2025 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 11/19/75

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: SAC, [redacted] (RUC)

UNSUBS (2); Visitors to LOPRC, 10/4/75, Occupants of Vehicle Bearing New York Tag 845-HIL
IS-CH
(OO:NY)

b3
b7E

Re WFO letter and LHM to Bureau dated 11/3/75, dual captioned "Liaison Office, People's Republic of China (LOPRC), [redacted] and [redacted] LOPRC National Day Reception, October 1, 1975, IS-CH, OO:WFO, [redacted]

Enclosed is one (1) copy of referenced LHM which is self explanatory concerning the LOPRC receptions of 10/1/75, 10/3/75, and 10/4/75. No enclosure designated Bureau as LHM previously furnished in referenced communication.

In matters where appropriate, cases being RUC'd to the Office of Origin. If photographs are available of captioned visit, these will be forwarded to the individual office.

Captioned license tag was observed by Special Agents of the FBI whose occupants were discharged at LOPRC on 10/4/75, where a celebration was in progress in honor of the PRC National Day. [redacted]

MCT-26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REC-38 EX-112

Classified by #7366
Exempt from GDS, ~~Categories~~ 2 and 3
Date of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~

5 DEC 2 1975

b3
b7E

(2)-Bureau
2-New York (Enc. 1)
2-[redacted]
BWK:cad
(6)

[redacted]

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

DEC 22 1975

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ b3 b6 b7C b7E

UNSUB(s) described as Oriental couple driving a black Cadillac. The National Law Enforcement Teletype System (NLETS) computer listed the following information for captioned license tag: Registered to [redacted] date of birth [redacted] address listed as [redacted]

INITIAL INVESTIGATION IN CAPTIONED MATTER MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH ESTABLISHED SOURCES AND AT NO TIME MUST THE SUBJECT BECOME AWARE OF FBI INTEREST.

Recipient offices are requested to handle this investigation in accordance with Section [redacted] Manual of Instructions, and Bureau authority is necessary for interview. b3 b7E

Once having identified the individual and employment, further investigation being left to the discretion of the Office of Origin.

The Bureau and WFO should be advised of the results of this investigation. Replies should be made to the individual WFO file. If Office of Origin finds it necessary to change title, please set out exact WFO original title in first paragraph of details.

WFO indices regarding captioned matter contain nothing identifiable.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-26-2025 BY: [redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: ~~SECRET~~

FROM : ADIC, [redacted] - C -

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS CLASSIFIED (S) EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

SUBJECT: UNSUBS (2);
Visitors to LOPRC,
10/4/75, Occupants of
Vehicle Bearing NY Tag [redacted]
IS-CH
(OO:NY)

b3 b6 b7C b7E

~~Classified by [redacted]~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 7-30-82~~

ReWFOairtel, 11/19/75, and WFO LHM, dated 11/3/75, captioned "LIAISON OFFICE, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (LOPRC), IS-CH".

Referenced airtel states that occupants of vehicle bearing NY license tag [redacted] were discharged at LOPRC on 10/4/75, where a celebration was in progress in honor of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) National Day. UNSUBS were described as a oriental couple driving a black Cadillac automobile. The National Law Enforcement Teletype System (NLETS) Computer listed the above vehicle registered to:

b6 b7C

[redacted]

DOB - [redacted]

Referenced WFO LHM states that the LOPRC held receptions in honor of National Day of 10/1/75. These receptions were held on 10/1, 10/3, and 10/4/75. The reception held on 10/4/75, was primarily for the local Chinese community and consisted of a movie showing and buffet. This reception was attended by approximately one hundred persons.

ST 142 REC-53

Inquiry of the NYS Motor Vehicle Bureau records 12/9/75, via computer terminal available at the NYO verified that NY license [redacted] is assigned to a [redacted] Cadillac

2-Bureau (RM)
1 [redacted]
1-New York (161-3050)
1-New York
CJP:cc
(5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Classified by 2609~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3~~
~~Date of Declassification: Indefinite~~

b3 b6 b7C b7E

FEB 11 1976

~~SECRET~~

5 5 MAR 5 1976

5010-106-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Sedan, black and registered to [redacted] to expire on [redacted] Her DOB was shown as [redacted] sex female. The records also reflect that she possesses a valid NYS Operators License. b3 b6 b7C b7E

A review of Coles Street and Telephone Directory for Nassau County, NY, conducted 12/10/75, reflects that one WILLIAM J. CASEY resides at no number, Glenwood Road, Roslyn Harbor, NY, and subscribes to telephone number 516-621-9332.

The indices of the NYO reviewed on 12/12/75, through 1/5/76, contained no information identifiable to [redacted] However, the above indices reflect that one WILLIAM J. CASEY, Glenwood Road, Roslyn Harbor, NY, was the subject of special inquiry investigation conducted during May, 1969, and December, 1975. (Bufile 161-6367) (NYfile 161-3050) He is currently being considered for Presidential appointment. This investigation reflects he was born 3/13/13, at NYC, and as of December, 1975, was President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the U.S. From 1969 - 1971, he was a member of the General Advisory Commission for Arms Control; 1971 - 1972, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C. and in 1972, Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State. This investigation established that he resides with [redacted] and [redacted] at [redacted] an estate situated on the North Shore of Long Island. The family enjoys an excellent reputation. He is listed in Who's Who in America, Volume 1, 38th Edition, Page 518. b6 b7C

For purposes of obtaining additional background information regarding [redacted] the following investigation was conducted through established sources: b6 b7C

The records of the Credit Information Corporation of NY as furnished by [redacted] to [redacted] on 12/12/75, reflect that [redacted] possesses a satisfactory credit rating.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

On 12/15/75, DI WILLIAM C. SCHMELTER, Records Bureau, PD, County of Nassau, Mineola, NY, advised that the records of his Bureau contain no information identifiable with [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

The records of the Board of Elections, Nassau County, 400 County Seat Drive, Mineola, NY, reviewed on 1/13/76, reflect that [redacted] registered to vote from that address on 10/3/64. She listed her DOB as [redacted] She was described as female, [redacted] 5'8", single and a college student attending the [redacted]

On 1/26/76, [redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY) [redacted] advised that he has known the CASEY family for several years and that their residence is known as May Knoll on Glenwood Road in Roslyn Harbor. He stated that the family consists of Mr. WILLIAM J. CASEY, [redacted] and a [redacted] approximately [redacted] years of age. They enjoy an excellent reputation as well as prominence in the community. He stated that [redacted] attended college and is a [redacted] She resides at home with [redacted] and does not appear to be employed. [redacted] stated that in the past during Mr. CASEY's assignments in Washington, D. C. [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

Inasmuch as UNSUBS utilized automobile registered to [redacted] of WILLIAM J. CASEY, it would appear in all probability that the contact with the LOPRC was of legitimate nature. Due to the prominence and sensitive position of WILLIAM J. CASEY, the NYO does not deem it advisable to conduct any further investigation in this matter.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

31

b6
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1 2

7/13/82 ~~SECRET~~ ROUTINE

149 FHQRR SFPD***FHQRR SFHDE HQ H0149 $HHYSHR 132130Z JUL 82

DMC

FM DIRECTOR FBI [redacted]

TO FBI SAN FRANCISCO [redacted] ROUTINE

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BT

~~S E C R E T~~

[redacted] FCI - R; 00: SF

CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~ IN ENTIRETY.

RE SF AIRTEL JUNE 11, 1982.

WHEN THE SUBJECT RETURNS TO THE U. S. [redacted] WILL NOTIFY FBIHQ. IF THE SUBJECT DOES MAKE CONTACT WITH [redacted] AND PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION THAT IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE AND SINGULAR IN NATURE THEN A BUREAU-SOURCE NUMBER WILL BE ASSIGNED. ALSO WHEN [redacted] FURNISHES THIS INFORMATION TO FBIHQ A NEW CODE NAME AND BUREAU FILE NUMBER WILL BE ASSIGNED AND SAN FRANCISCO WILL BE NOTIFIED BY SECURE TELETYPE.

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b7E

FBIHQ IS APPRECIATIVE OF SAN FRANCISCO'S INITIATIVE AND ENTHUSIASM IN THIS MATTER.

~~C AND E 353, REASON E2 AND 3I, DRD JULY 13, 2002~~ [redacted]

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7/13/82 4437/5 4578

1 - [redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

[redacted]

JUL 15 1982

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
JUL 14 1982

[redacted]

76 JUL 20 1982

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 2 CONTINUATION SHEET

START HERE

BT

1

DO NOT TYPE PAST THIS LINE

DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE

FBI/DOJ

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

NOTE:

[redacted] WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF OUR SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE. THE SUBJECT DID NOT PROVIDE ANY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION, NOR WOULD HE SIGN AN AGREEMENT OR TAKE ANY MONEY, BUT HE DID AGREE TO MEET WITH A [redacted] CONTACT WHEN HE RETURNS TO THE U. S. IN THE FUTURE. IN REFERENCE SAN FRANCISCO AIRTEL, SAN FRANCISCO REQUESTED A NEW CASE CAPTION AND NEW FBIHQ AND SAN FRANCISCO FILE NUMBERS FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY. SAN FRANCISCO ALSO REQUESTED A BUREAU-SOURCE NUMBER BE ASSIGNED TO SUBJECT FOR DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION THAT SUBJECT MIGHT PROVIDE IN THE FUTURE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THESE TWO REQUESTS ARE PREMATURE AND NOT NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. ~~(S)~~ (U)

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[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SF0983 2100112Z

RR HI

DE SF 013

R 2801092 JUL 82

FM SAN FRANCISCO [redacted]

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE [redacted]

BT

~~S E C R E I~~

ATTENTION INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [redacted]

[redacted] FCI - R (A), OO: SAN FRANCISCO

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

29 JUL 82 01 35
(P) (SQD 12)
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

Exec. AD-Adm. ___
Exec. AD-Inv. ___
Exec. AD-LES ___
Asst. Dir.: b3
Adm. Servs. b6
Crim. Inv. b7C
Ident. b7E
Inspe.
Intell.
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Rec. Mgmt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___

[redacted]

ALL MARKINGS, NOTATIONS, AND ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~.

RE SAN FRANCISCO TELETYPE TO FBIHQ DATED MAY 20, 1982.

REFERENCED SAN FRANCISCO TELETYPE PROVIDED JUSTIFICATION FOR GRANTING OF INCENTIVE AWARDS TO SAN FRANCISCO SPECIAL AGENTS [redacted] AND [redacted] FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN CAPTIONED OPERATION.

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AT THIS TIME, SAN FRANCISCO WOULD ALSO LIKE TO RECOMMEND THAT FBIHQ CONSIDER A LETTER OF APPRECIATION TO [redacted] BRINGING [redacted]

16 APR 14 1983

b6
b7C

[redacted]

Id Casey
Let to
8-2-82

[redacted]

99 MAY 11 1983

[redacted]

PERS. REC. UNIT

TO HIS ATTENTION THE OUTSTANDING WORK DONE IN THIS OPERATION BY THEIR SAN FRANCISCO BASE EMPLOYEES, NAMELY [redacted]

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IT WAS THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THESE [redacted] WORKING JOINTLY WITH SAS [redacted] AND [redacted] THAT CAPTIONED OPERATION WAS SUCCESSFUL IN ITS OUTCOME. IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED THAT FBIHQ PREPARE AND FORWARD SUCH A LETTER OF APPRECIATION AT ITS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

~~C AND E BY G-3, REASONS 2 & 3, DRD JULY 28, 2002.~~

BT

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

SECRET

12356 11-13-90

August 12, 1982

(S-1 [redacted]) (U)

Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

DELIVERED BY LIAI [redacted]
DATE 8/19/82

Dear Bill:

This is just a brief note to commend several of your representatives in San Francisco for the outstanding cooperation they furnished in connection with [redacted] namely, [redacted] to be of great assistance, always displaying very professional attitudes and paying particular attention to detail. The information obtained through this coordination between our agencies was crucial to the successful outcome of the operation, and I hope you will convey our sincere gratitude to each of these employees for a job well done. (S) (U)

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[redacted] 11-13-90

Sincerely,

DE-82 [redacted]

William H. Webster
Director

4-14-83

1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. O'Malley
1 - [redacted]

SECRET

Classified and Extended by [redacted]
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4. (2 and 3)
Date of Review OADR

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(U)

NOTE: Letter recommended by SAC, San Francisco, and ID concurred. Bufiles reflect nothing to preclude.

[redacted]

Exec AD Adm. ___
Exec AD Inv. ___
Exec AD LES ___
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. ___
Crim. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Insp. ___
Intell. ___
Lab. ___
Legal C ___
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ___
Rec. Mgmt. ___
Tech. Servs. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director's Sec'y ___

[redacted] (10) [redacted]

APPROVED: Adm. Serv. ___ Legal Coun. ___
Crim. Inv. ___ Cong. & Insp ___
Rec. Mgmt. ___
Ident. ___ Tech. Servs ___
Intell. ___ Training ___
Laboratory ___ Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ___

[redacted]

MAIL ROOM

61 MAY 10 '83

Declassified per Reuter 9-25-90 Rhoads Brachi

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-23-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

303

4-650 (Rev. 12-5-80)

Memorandum

b3
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b7E

To : [redacted]

Date 7/29/82

From : [redacted]

Subject : [redacted]

The above-captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Systems Section, Records Management Division. You are requested to have the responsible substantive supervisor review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the general files. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Special File Room Subunit, Room 5991. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

maintain this file in the Special File Room

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[redacted]

ORDED
AUG 2 1982

742
78 AUG 21982

FBI/DOJ

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

303

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~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: [redacted]
CHARACTER: FCI - R

[redacted]

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [redacted] EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, [redacted] SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST." IT SHOULD THEREAFTER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

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IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED IN REPORTING THE MANNER IN WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY [redacted]

NO DISSEMINATION IS TO BE MADE OF ANY INFORMATION DERIVED FROM ASSET WITHOUT BUREAU AUTHORITY.

CLASSIFICATION:

~~SECRET~~

The Bureau advised on 11/25/81 of the then recent receipt of the following information from [redacted]

[redacted]

2
1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -

NOT RECORDED
46 JUL 23 1982

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1-NYO
1-SF
1-BUFO

"ROUTE IN ENVELOPE"

~~SECRET~~

~~CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY~~ [redacted]
~~REASON FOR EXTENSION:~~
~~FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2)~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION:~~
~~NOVEMBER 25, 2001~~

77 JUL 26 1982

[redacted]

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There is no information available regarding [redacted] (S) (U)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1370544-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 22
Page 6 ~ Duplicate;
Page 7 ~ Duplicate;
Page 8 ~ Duplicate;
Page 12 ~ Duplicate;
Page 13 ~ Duplicate;
Page 14 ~ Duplicate;
Page 15 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 16 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 17 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 18 ~ Duplicate;
Page 19 ~ Duplicate;
Page 20 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 26 ~ Duplicate;
Page 44 ~ Duplicate;
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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-302

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/18/86

1 ~~SECRET~~

This entire communication is classified ~~"SECRET"~~.

On October 31, 1986, WILLIAM J. CASEY, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), was interviewed by the undersigned Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office (WFO), at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Langley, Virginia. After being apprised of the interviewing Agents' identities and purpose, CASEY furnished the following information:

CASEY was queried regarding any knowledge he had concerning the leak or leaks of classified information in an article appearing on October 2, 1986 in the Washington Post entitled, "Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan", by reporter [redacted] In addition, CASEY was shown four classified documents from which excerpts were drawn and used verbatim in the referenced news article. Finally, CASEY was queried regarding pertinent information obtained through his attendance at a National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting on August 14, 1986.

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After viewing pertinent classified documents, CASEY stated that he had no specific recollection of having seen any of them. He stated, however, that he was generally familiar with the subjects covered in the documents. CASEY stated that such a large volume of documents come his way that it is impossible for him to read and be completely familiar with each specific document.

CASEY stated that he recalled attending the NSPG meeting on August 14, 1986. He recalled hearing President REAGAN make a joke about Libya leader GADHAFI. CASEY stated, however,

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFIED BY: G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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Investigation on 10/31/86 at Langley, VA. File # [redacted]
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 11/7/86

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside of your agency.

that he did not recall Secretary of State GEORGE SCHULTZ making a response to this joke. CASEY stated that he did not think that he had repeated the jokes outside of the meeting. He further stated that he did not take notes at the meeting.

CASEY stated that he briefed at least two of his subordinates in a "general way" after the NSPG meeting. These individuals were [redacted] and [redacted] He recalled briefing them by saying that it was time to "unleash the secret weapon". By this CASEY was referring to a decision made at the NSPG meeting to send Ambassador VERNON WALTERS to Europe. A decision was reached at the NSPG level that efforts would be made to keep the anxiety level of GADHAFI high. b6 b7C

When asked why reporter [redacted] identified a particular classified document in this matter as a document sent to CASEY, CASEY stated that he had no explanation for why [redacted] would have made this reference. It is noted that CASEY was among a list of several principals on a cover memo which was dated one day prior to the NSPG meeting.

CASEY stated that he is acquainted with reporter [redacted] CASEY stated that he knows [redacted] as a "journalist around town". CASEY stated that, from time to time, he and [redacted] have attended the same social functions. CASEY stated that he had been interviewed by [redacted] in the past for different news articles. [redacted] interviewed CASEY when he was doing a series of background articles on CASEY in the Washington Post. Also, [redacted] interviewed CASEY when [redacted] was working on a terrorism piece. Recently, when CASEY learned that [redacted] was informing others that CASEY was giving him special help on a book, CASEY wrote a letter to [redacted] strongly reminding [redacted] that this was not in fact the case. CASEY stated that [redacted] was "touting himself" by telling people that CASEY was giving him help. CASEY did admit that on two occasions when he was out of town, [redacted] showed up and was offered a ride back to the Washington area with CASEY. On one other occasion, CASEY was interviewed by [redacted] regarding information about [redacted] b6 b7C

CASEY advised that he is sophisticated when it comes to dealing with reporters and has no doubts that he has always conducted himself properly around [redacted] He stated that he has never compromised any classified information to [redacted] Further, CASEY stated that he did not talk to [redacted] in the

time frame of this investigation.

CASEY stated that he did not leak classified information in this matter and had no reason to doubt any of his staff. Further, he had no first hand information regarding the identity of the leaker.

CASEY stated that he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination in this matter.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-302

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/24/86

1 ~~SECRET~~

This entire communication is classified ~~"SECRET"~~.

On October 28, 1986, [redacted] was interviewed by the undersigned Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office (WFO), at [redacted] Present during the interview was [redacted] After being apprised of the interviewing Agent's identity and purpose, [redacted] furnished the following information:

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[redacted] was queried regarding any knowledge he might have regarding the leak or leaks of classified information in the Washington Post in an article appearing on October 2, 1986 by reporter [redacted] entitled, "Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan". In addition, [redacted] was shown four classified documents from which excerpts were drawn and used verbatim in the referenced news article.

[redacted] stated that he attended [redacted] stated that at meetings of this type he is always careful to talk in "generalizations" and stated that no discussions were had regarding covert operations. [redacted] recalled having a conversation with [redacted] regarding the need to protect sensitive information from leaks. [redacted] stated that he had no first hand information on whether or not any attendees at the [redacted] meeting would have had a motivation to leak classified information in this matter. [redacted] recalled [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFIED BY: G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Investigation on 10/28/86 at [redacted] File # [redacted]

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b7C
b7E

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 11/4/86

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302a

Continuation of [redacted] "SECRET" Page -2-

[redacted]

Regarding the documents in this matter, [redacted] stated that he did not recall having seen or having access to a three page memorandum to the President. He stated that he was familiar with the document entitled, [redacted] He stated that he received a copy of this document on August 13, 1986 after being forwarded it by [redacted] stated that this document would have been granted access to certain individuals [redacted] He named [redacted] as individuals who might have seen this paper. He stated that [redacted] might have been familiar with the substance in the paper but would not have had access to the actual paper. [redacted] stated that he had received a copy of a paper entitled, [redacted] at the [redacted] meeting on August 7, 1986. This paper would have received the same handling as the previous one received by him on August 13, 1986. Finally, [redacted] stated that he had seen and had access to a [redacted] paper entitled, [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that [redacted] the Director of Counter Intelligence, WILLIAM J. CASEY, prior to a National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting on August 14, 1986. [redacted] stated that DCI CASEY would not have seen or been familiar with the specific documents in this case, in all likelihood. He stated that only CASEY would know whether or not he had seen any of the back-up documents in this matter. [redacted] recalled staffing CASEY at 2:00 p.m. on August 13, 1986.

When asked whether or not CASEY briefed him subsequent to the NSPG meeting, [redacted] stated that CASEY may have informally spoken to both he and [redacted] stated that there was no formal notation of this on his calendar and stated that he could not specifically recall a formal briefing. He stated, however, that it was possible that CASEY might have informally filled him in on some of the details at the meeting.

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[redacted] stated that he had never heard jokes made at the NSPG meeting by President REAGAN or Secretary of State GEORGE SCHULTZ. He stated that he read them for the first time in the Washington Post article. [redacted] also stated that he had never discussed the position taken by Chairman of the Joint Chief of

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Staffs, WILLIAM J. CROWE, at the NSPG meeting.

[redacted] stated that he does not know reporter [redacted] and was not contacted by [redacted] in this matter. He stated that he did not leak classified information in this matter and had no idea on who the leaker might be. He stated he had no reason to doubt the loyalty of any of his staff in their handling of classified documents pertaining to this investigation.

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[redacted] stated that he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination in this matter.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY [redacted]

FD-302 (REV. 3-10-82)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/3/87

1

This communication is classified ~~"Secret"~~ in its entirety.

On November 10, 1986, [redacted] was interviewed by the undersigned Special Agent (SA) of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), Washington Field Office, at [redacted] After being apprised of the interviewing agent's identity and purpose, [redacted] furnished the following information: b3 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] was queried regarding the leak or leaks of classified information appearing in an article on October 2, 1986, in the WASHINGTON POST entitled "Qadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan," by reporter [redacted] In addition, [redacted] was shown four classified documents from which excerpts were drawn and used verbatim in the referenced news article. [redacted] advised that he attends [redacted] As a result, he attended a [redacted] held on August 7, 1986, and was familiar with documents prepared for this [redacted] and subsequent documents generated after the [redacted] When shown the four classified documents pertaining in this investigation, [redacted] advised that he had [redacted] He could not recall whether or not he had seen [redacted] He stated that [redacted] stated that he had seen the two other classified documents, which were [redacted] meeting on August 7, 1986. Specifically, these documents were [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

Concerning the handling of those documents which [redacted] recalled having seen, [redacted] stated that [redacted] would have been viewed by no one other than himself. He stated that, if he had brought this document back to his office, it would have gone in his personal safe, which is b3 b6 b7C b7E

Investigation on 11/10/86 at [redacted] File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 11/14/86

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

accessible only to his Secretary, [redacted] [redacted] stated that he had no reason to doubt [redacted] handling of sensitive/classified material. [redacted] stated that, as far as the handling of the [redacted] he stated this document would have been shared with a total of two other people under his supervision. Specifically, [redacted] stated that these documents would have been shown to [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] had orally advised both the Director of Central Intelligence, WILLIAM CASEY, [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that he did hear secondhand information that NSC Staffer [redacted] had harbored resentment toward NSC Staffer [redacted] after a leak of information to the Christian Science Monitor. [redacted] was not sure if this leak had occurred in the Christian Science Monitor or the Wall Street Journal. [redacted] stated that he was unaware of any other conflicts between [redacted] and [redacted] but stated that, in his dealings with NSC Staffers, he would not have thought it uncommon for a rivalry to exist over the authorship of NSC papers. b3 b6 b7C b7E

Regarding the other attendees at the [redacted] meeting, [redacted] stated that all attendees seemed supportive of the program. [redacted] stated that the DEPARTMENT OF STATE had been supportive of the program but he also noted that in the past he had refused to brief INR on details of the program. After this refusal, [redacted] stated that he talked to [redacted] and reached an agreement with him that [redacted] would provide a briefing to [redacted] stated that this initial refusal to provide a brief was solely to protect the information from wider than necessary dissemination.

[redacted] stated that he was not briefed after a NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG) meeting held on August 14, 1986, attended by DCI CASEY. [redacted] stated that the only feedback that he received subsequent to this meeting was that CASEY had reported that a decision was reached in the meeting to send Ambassador VERNON WALTERS to France.

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[redacted] stated that he does not personally know [redacted] and stated that he was not contacted by [redacted] prior to the appearance of this article on October 2, 1986. [redacted] stated that he did not leak classified information in this matter and had no information on who the identity of the leaker was. Again [redacted] stated he had no reason to doubt the loyalty of any of his staff in handling classified material which might have been in his possession.

[redacted] stated that he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination in this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 07-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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[redacted]

Searched [redacted]
Serialized [redacted]
Indexed [redacted]
Filed [redacted]

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SECRET

John L. Martin, Chief
Internal Security Section
Criminal Division

March 11, 1988

Steven L. Pomerantz, Chief
Counterterrorism Section
Criminal Investigative Divison

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UNSUB(S); UDCI IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "GADHAFI TARGET OF SECRET U.S. DECEPTION PLAN" ON OCTOBER 2, 1986, BY [redacted] IN THE WASHINGTON POST

This communication is classified "Secret" in its entirety.

An article entitled "Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan" by [redacted] appeared in The Washington Post on October 2, 1986. This article outlines a broad Reagan administration plan to use covert diplomatic and economic means to deter Libyan-sponsored terrorism. Information contained in this article was disclosed from four separate classified documents. This article is the third in a series of four articles written by [redacted] relating to U.S. plans focused on Libya.

This investigation was instituted on October 2, 1986, based on verbal authority from DOJ, and interviews were conducted at the NSC on the same day.

Preliminary interviews and the initial analysis of the article showed that four classified documents formed the basis for the article. Additional unclassified information in the article (e.g., the jokes told by President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz) indicated knowledge of a meeting which was attended by a small group of people.

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Declassify on: OADR

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OCT 16 1988

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CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
5 10/23/89 [redacted]

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DATE 07-23-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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UPDT ACTION S FOIA 315175 EXT 0 RECEIVED 50282 RESPONSED 0 SOURCE
SUBJECT [redacted]
REQUESTER [redacted] TITLE MS
ADDRESS [redacted] LINE 3 C/N&A
LINE [redacted] LINE 4 WASHINGTON, DC 20520
LINE 5 DELIC
UNIT DOS ROCH CLERK ST423 ASSIGNED 50582 TYPE OF REQUEST P TYPE OF REQUESTER
FEE WAIVER DATE 0 OUTCOME FOIA FILE 0 0 DATE READY 51785
ORIG ASSIGNED DISCLOSURE 52282 ANALYST CODE [redacted] ASSIGNED 60782 ANAL CNT 06
ESTIMATED PAGES TO REVIEW 50 TYPES OF MAIN FILES M
MISCELLANEOUS REF: DEPT. OF STATE/P 9515282/REF'S TO [redacted] DOJ, DSDS
PREPROCESSED PAGES RELEASED 0
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FINAL PAGES REV 0 REL 0 TOTAL PAGES REV 32 REL 25
TOTAL FEES RCVD CLER 0 00 PROF 0 00 DUP 0 00 OTHER 0 00
FOIA EXEMPT B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7A B7B B7C B7D B7E B7F
B8 B9 RULE 6 DEC CREN 28USC552 OTHER
PRIVACY EXEMPT K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7 J1 J2 D5 MISC
PROCESSED UNDER CLOSED THRU PROCESS DATE 0 REASON LAST UPDATE 110682

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-23-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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[redacted]

CHARTERED
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

[redacted]

COUNSEL

[redacted]

[redacted]

FAX: [redacted]

July 31, 1991

[redacted] Supervisory Special Agent
Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Section
Information Management Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

b6
b7C

Dear Agent [redacted]

On July 24, 1991, I mailed to you a Privacy Act/Freedom of Information Act request on behalf of [redacted] an employee of [redacted] Upon review of that letter, I noted a number of typographical errors. Most significantly several references in the letter to specific appendices were incorrect.

Please accept the enclosed revised letter as a substitute for the July 24, 1991 Privacy Act/Freedom of Information Act request. The enclosed letter corrects all typographical errors, but makes no substantive changes.

Very truly yours,

[redacted]

[redacted]
Enclosure

cc: [redacted]

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8/26/91

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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[redacted]

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Filed

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Best Available Copy

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BY LIAISON

Date: August 10, 1987

To: [redacted] b7C

[redacted] b6 b7C

Attention: [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

From: Floyd I. Clarke
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

Subject: [redacted]

This communication is classified "Secret" in its entirety. Dissemination control is retained by FBI Headquarters. b6 b7C

With regards to your letter dated July 24, 1987, wherein you requested copies of FBI investigative reports concerning [redacted] the following encapsulization is being provided inasmuch as this matter is still under intensive investigation and a final report will be prepared at the conclusion of that investigative activity.

On October 2, 1986, an article entitled, "Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plans," appeared in The Washington Post, which was authored by reporter [redacted] The article outlined a broad Reagan administration plan to use covert diplomatic and economic means to deter Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

[redacted]

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Classified by: 6C3J
Declassify on: OADR

AUG 27 19

See Note Page Three

1 - Mr. Clarke
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. Pomerantz
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted] b7C

b6 b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
ON 8/10/99

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[redacted] b7C

Preliminary interviews and initial analysis of the articles disclosed that four classified documents formed the basis for the article. Additional unclassified information in the article (e.g., the jokes told by President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz) indicated knowledge of a meeting which was attended by a small group of people.

The FBI conducted extensive interviews of individuals representing the following Government agencies/offices: National Security Council (NSC), United States Department of State (USDS), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Treasury, [redacted] Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Justice (DOJ), and White House staff. Vice President George Bush, former Chief of Staff [redacted] Regan, former Secretary of the Treasury [redacted], Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and [redacted] were also interviewed in this matter. [redacted]

REFER

REFER b7D

[redacted] admitted [redacted] friendship with [redacted] but denied leaking the classified information to him. She was asked to take a polygraph examination by the FBI, but refused. b6 b7C

Subsequent to [redacted] being relieved of her duties [redacted] a number of documents were obtained from her office, three of which contained information which was disclosed in the [redacted] article. It is also noted that information contained in other documents located in [redacted] office has been identified as being related to other unauthorized disclosures of classified information which are currently under investigation by the FBI.

These documents have been processed for latent fingerprints by the FBI Laboratory, which successfully developed a large number of unidentified fingerprints. Investigation is currently being conducted by a number of FBI field offices to identify the individual(s) whose fingerprints appear on the examined documents.

Upon completion of this investigation, you will be immediataly apprised of the results.

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b7C [redacted] SECRET

b7C Note: This letter is in response to a request from [redacted] dated July 24, 1987, requesting copies of the FBI investigative reports relating to the unlawful disclosure of classified information to reporter [redacted] of The Washington Post. As embodied in the letter, the investigation of [redacted] is still in a pending status, with the focus of the investigation centered on the identification of fingerprints [redacted] on critical documents.

b7C [redacted]

b7C In a conference with Deputy Chief [redacted] Internal Security Section, DOJ, on July 31, 1987, regarding the propriety of releasing the details of this investigation to the USOS, [redacted] advised that in light of the tenuous circumstances surrounding [redacted] current employment at the State Department that this information could be released so as to assist State Department officials in rendering a decision as to what action they wish to initiate with regards to [redacted]

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APPROVED: Adm. Servs. [redacted] Off. of Cong. Comm. Off. Public Affs. Ident. Off. Director Off. of Equal Emp. Opp. Fin. Mgmt. Laboratory Tech. Servs. Legal Coun. Training

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342-12-6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-23-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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[redacted]

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
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☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:
☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 6/2/87

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: TERRORISM SECTION, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE [redacted] (C)(C-3)

UNSUB(S);
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE
IDENTITY AND POSITION OF
[redacted] (PROTECT IDENTITY);
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT;
OO:WFO

SECRET

This communication is classified "SECRET".

Re Bureau airtel to WFO, 2/13/87.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and five (5) copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) regarding the captioned matter.

As directed in the referenced airtel, investigation in this matter was coordinated with the investigation captioned, "Unsub(s); Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information (UDCI) in the Washington Post, October 2, 1986, in an article by [redacted] entitled, 'Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan'; Espionage-X (Media Leak); OO:FBIHQ", [redacted] Circumstantial evidence developed in that matter identified [redacted] as a suspect. However, no direct evidence was developed indicating that [redacted] had provided [redacted] with classified National Security Council (NSC) documents. Furthermore, no direct evidence was developed indicating that [redacted] had verbally provided [redacted] with classified NSC information with the intent, on [redacted] part, to damage the national security of the United States. Due to the lack of direct evidence, that matter was RUC'D DE-20[redacted]

SECRET
CLASSIFIED BY: C-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

ENCLOSURE

3-Bureau (Enc. 6)
1-Washington Field Office
[redacted] (4)

Approved: [redacted] Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time) Per _____

1-CC [redacted] Rm. 4251 6-8-87
CC DUE 6-11-87

[redacted] SEC UNIT

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As reported in the enclosed LHM a review of documents recovered from [redacted] office determined that [redacted]

[redacted]

(5)

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

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WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
June 2, 1987
S E C R E T

UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S);
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY
AND POSITION OF [redacted]
(PROTECT IDENTITY);
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT

b7C

This ~~entire~~ communication is classified ~~"SECRET"~~.

Attached is a copy of an article by [redacted]
entitled, "State Department Plan Urged Libyan Coup" that appeared
in the Washington Post on October 5, 1986.

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[redacted] b1, REFER (S)

[redacted] b1, REFER (S)

S E C R E T
~~SENSITIVE~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

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FOI/PA # 315,195
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 6/2/89 INITIALS [redacted] b7C

[redacted] b1

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by Mathilde Sweeney
Declassify on: OADR
6/2/89

[redacted]

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ENCLOSURE

DATE: 5 Oct-86
PAGE: A1

State Dept. Plan Urged Libya Coup

Reagan Policy Deleted Mention of Prompting Gadhafi Assassination

By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer

A State Department working paper used last August in drawing up the Reagan administration's plan of deception and disinformation against Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi advocated a strategy that could lead to "a coup or assassination attempt" against Gadhafi by his own military or other opponents.

The memo, circulated by the State Department on Aug. 6 in advance of a White House meeting of officials at the assistant secretary level, stated, "The goal of our near-term strategy should be to continue Gadhafi's paranoia so that he remains preoccupied, off-balance ... [and] believes that the army and other elements in Libya are plotting against him—possibly with Soviet help. Believing that, he may increase the pressure on the [Libyan] army, which in turn may prompt a coup or assassination attempt."

The final directive approved by President Reagan in mid-August did not mention assassination. Instead, it ordered covert, diplomatic and economic steps designed to deter Libyan-sponsored terrorism and bring about a change of leadership in Libya.

Administration officials have said explicitly that the overall deception policy does not directly seek assassination of Gadhafi, although some officials acknowledge that that could be one outcome. A 1981 executive order signed by Reagan directs that "no person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination."

An administration official [illegible] said the following White House response: "The document in question is a working paper with no standing as administration policy. Moreover, any inference in the document that a policy option was ever considered to promote the assassination of Gadhafi is wrong. Support for assassination in any form has never been and is not now a part of administration policy."

The statement added, "Advocating change in a governmental regime is not the same as advocating assassination. To associate the two is irresponsible."

Several senior administration officials privately criticized the ambiguity of overall policy toward Gadhafi, which they see as aimed at removing him without directly employing necessary or likely means for doing so. "They want him out but not the dirty hands," said one ranking administration official.

Similarly, some sources said administration officials failed to realize that spreading disinformation to deceive Gadhafi would also mislead the American news media and public. They also said that the policy of deception and disinformation grew out of an overreaction by administration officials to a new intelligence report on Gadhafi's state of mind.

The intelligence report, delivered in July to Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Casey, said Gadhafi had acted so bizarrely in a meeting with Yemeni officials that he seemed to be going out of control and might be on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Some administration officials saw in this an opportunity to increase psychological pressure on Gadhafi, whom they were determined to oust if they could.

Subsequent, more reliable intelligence indicated that the initial report was exaggerated. Gadhafi actually sat through the meeting with the Yemenis in silence, apparently sulking in a corner, according to sources. Such behavior is not unusual for the mercurial Libyan leader, according to government specialists, but by the time the Gadhafi behavior was understood, a crucial interagency review was under way.

Keenly attentive to Gadhafi's every step, fearing a resurgence of his terrorist plots and wishing to capitalize on the deterrent value of the April 14 U.S. bombing raid on Libya, the administration seized on the original report of the Libyan's instability and went into high gear.

The State and Defense departments, the CIA and the White House began to consider what steps might be taken to keep up the pressure on Gadhafi and jar him psychologically as part of another phase of the yearlong effort to covertly undermine his regime.

Although there was other evidence that Gadhafi was in a depression after the U.S. raid, sources cite the administration's tendency to jump to conclusions from too little or single intelligence reports [illegible] indicative of the hit-or-miss [illegible] intelligence information. "It's no longer rational," said one intelligence official. "The use and tuning of [intelligence reports] does not have the clear-headed, dispassionate eye that is required."

But Casey [illegible] and wanted more action and more results, according to [illegible].

Richard Kerr, the CIA's new deputy director for intelligence analysis, and Thomas Tweeten, the senior operations official for the Near East and Asia, went to work, according to sources. Escalation of the psychological war against Gadhafi was proposed.

The 17th anniversary of Gadhafi's revolution was coming up on Sept. 1. He was supposed to make a speech to mark the occasion, an important symbolic event. U.S. officials speculated on the possibility of frightening him into not appearing. There was reliable intelligence that he had moved Libyan military headquarters from the coast inland nearly 500 miles to Kufrah. He was obviously fearful, officials concluded, and wanted the headquarters to be less accessible to U.S. carrier-based bombers.

Inside the intelligence community and within the State Department and the White House, the debate began. Could Gadhafi be caused to lose confidence in himself? If he could be kept in hiding for the anniversary, what impact would it have here on the Libyan people? Or on the Libyan military that is supposed to be restive and unhappy with their leader?

The officials involved in these discussions knew that Casey, Shultz and other top officials were frustrated that the CIA effort to undermine and overthrow Gadhafi had not succeeded. "We had a policy that was working well, deterring terrorism, but [senior administration officials] wanted to go further and change the regime," said one source.

A seven-page memo dated Aug 6 from the State Department's office of intelligence and research was distributed to senior middle-level officials in preparation for an upcoming interagency meeting. It was this memo that proposed the "real and illusory events" and speculated that enough pressure on Gadhafi might prompt him to so press his own military and other Libyan elements that they could attempt to assassinate him.

One recipient of the memo was Lt. Gen. John H. Moellering, assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to sources. They said that Moellering expressed dismay within the Pentagon and to Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that the administration might be embarking on a dangerous course. He argued that such a plan could be the equivalent of waving a red flag in front of the unstable Libyan leader.

He and others also expressed concern that U.S. officials were discussing actions designed to prompt an "assassination" despite what they

took to be a ban on U.S. [illegible] great participation such [illegible].

On Aug. 7 at 4:30 p.m., the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) met in the White House situation room. There senior representatives from the CIA, the State Department and White House endorsed the overall plan outlined in the State Department memo and other planning documents.

Vincent M. Cannistraro, a veteran CIA operations officer and director of intelligence on the National Security Council staff, and Howard R. Teicher, the director of the office of political military affairs in the NSC, supported the disinformation and deception plan, the sources said.

Informed sources said that they understood that White House national security affairs adviser John M. Poindexter approved the general principles and approaches of the St. Department memo, but the reference to prompting an "assassination attempt" was removed.

A meeting with the president to consider the next steps on Libya was scheduled for Aug. 14. That was the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), the Cabinet-level discussion panel involving Reagan and his top advisers.

Before the meeting, Poindexter sent the president a three-page memo outlining the next steps and saying that a key element of the strategy was to combine "real and illusionary events—through a disinformation program—with the basic goal of making Gadhafi think that there is a high degree of internal opposition to him within Libya, that his key trusted aides are disloyal, that the U.S. is about to move against him militarily."

This section of Poindexter's memo reflected the Aug. 6 State Department proposal for "a sequenced chain of real and illusory events . . . ."

Sources said Reagan approved the overall plan and that it was made formal in a National Security Decision Document he signed. That document does not mention assassination, and the only deception was to be directed abroad and at Gadhafi.

Poindexter's aide Teicher was, according to sources, the only non-Cabinet-level official at the Aug. 11 NSPG meeting. He was the note-taker for the one-hour session.

White House officials said that Teicher was one of the officials who spoke with The Wall Street Journal before its Aug. 25 story that said "the U.S. and Libya are on a collision course again," and painted a picture of impending U.S. military action in response to Gadhafi's alleged renewal of terrorist plots.

[illegible] has said he spoke with [illegible] of the Journal after, but before its publication but that he did not leak anything and the author already had all the details.

The White House has taken the position that the Journal article was "generally correct" but that the information was not authorized for release. One White House official said recently that information provided the Journal was part of a "Lone Ranger operation" by one or more officials but not Teicher.

After The Washington Post disclosed details of the administration's deception campaign against Gadhafi last week, administration officials disputed the suggestion—contained in Poindexter's August memo to Reagan—that Gadhafi was "quiescent" on the terrorist front at the time the campaign against him was being planned.

The most recent administration position on whether Gadhafi was stepping up terrorist plans last summer was provided Thursday by a senior administration official who said that in July the intelligence was tentative—"it didn't say that he [Gadhafi] was going to go off and bomb something or go off and take somebody hostage or hijack an airplane. It wasn't that kind of hard intelligence, but there were little pieces that indicated he was beginning to move."

Intelligence experts said the U.S. intelligence agencies and the White House were on the lookout for anything on Gadhafi. Said one well-placed expert, "The intelligence machinery was cocked, a hair-trigger . . . . Five Libyans arriving in Paris with five suitcases became an intelligence report.

"It just wasn't hard," said this expert, who has firsthand knowledge of the reports. "Poindexter would not have said 'quiescent' to the president if that was not the case . . . ." At the same time there was indication that the Libyan infrastructure was being reassembled after so many Libyan diplomats allegedly involved in terrorism were expelled from European capitals.

He added, "The administration and the intelligence agencies are paranoid about Gadhafi and for good reason."

He said some members of the administration are not skilled at interpreting raw intelligence, saying it is an art form and that many officials are inclined to overstate the Libyan problem.

At the same time, sources said the administration had dozens of reports showing meetings and travel by Libyans that were deemed suspicious.

A senior administration official said the increased number of intelligence reports hinting at terrorist activity in part reflects a vastly improved intelligence collection system and the high priority assigned to reports of possible terrorist incidents, especially involving Libya, a known and proven sponsor of terrorist plots.

He said there are "lots of 'heads up' reports and that does not necessarily mean there is renewed activity . . . . We are just better and more attentive . . . . Also, our ability to disseminate it is better."

One former head of a U.S. intelligence agency said it is his understanding that the intelligence on Libya and Libyan activities is not of a very high quality and attributes the disagreements to the weakness of the information. He added, "When the intelligence is good and incontrovertible, there is agreement. You get disagreements when no one has enough good information."

Reagan and other administration officials on Thursday denied any intent to have the disinformation appear in the U.S. news media. At the same time, they acknowledged that there was a plan to deceive Gadhafi.

Whether the White House deliberately attempted to spread disinformation, or whether one aide without authorization passed on the disinformation to U.S. news media, officials said that a simple fact was overlooked: it is impossible to have a high-level, high-visibility effort of deception aimed abroad without some or all of the information appearing in the U.S. media.

A former CIA officer said that the agency normally undertakes small, low-level disinformation campaigns in a few countries or a single country. But in the current anti-Gadhafi plan, the former officer said, "the fire of disinformation was supposed to sweep across the Middle East and Europe . . . and no one was supposed to notice? They were kidding themselves."

The recirculation back into the U.S. news media of disinformation planted abroad by the CIA is often referred to as "blowback." But one source familiar with the administration strategy said that what happened in the latest Gadhafi ploy was "blow-front" because the launch of the idea, intentional or not, was in the U.S. media.

Staff researcher Barbara Feinman contributed to this report.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

2 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☒ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552		Section 552a
☐ (b)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☐ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
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FBI/DOJ

Best Available Copy

FD-302

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/21/87

1 S E C X E T

This ~~entire~~ communication is classified ~~"SECRET"~~.

A review was made of documents removed by the National Security Council (NSC) Security Office from room 351 of the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB), Washington, D.C. That room had been the office of [redacted] up until her appointment to the NSC was terminated on October 21, 1986. The documents were obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from the NSC Security Office on November 17, 1986. b6 b7C

[redacted] b1, REFE

[redacted] (S) b1, REFE.

S E C X E T

~~CLASSIFIED BY: C-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Investigation on 5/20/87 at Washington, D.C. File # [redacted]

7C by SA [redacted] Date dictated 5/21/87

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FA # 315,195
AL #
AVIL ACT. #
G. # 12356
ATE 6/21/89 INITIALS [redacted] b7C

[redacted] (S) L T

Classified by Matilde Sources
Declassify on: OADR
6/21/89

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-24-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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Serialized
Indexed
Filed

HOW PROGRAM ON LIBYA DEVELOPED

■ **April 14:** U.S. bombing raid on Libya.

■ **July:** New intelligence report questioning the mental stability of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi triggers interagency review of U.S.-Libyan policy.

■ **Aug. 6:** State Department group circulates to interagency group a memo proposing a disinformation and deception campaign and suggesting such a campaign could trigger an assassination attempt on Gadhafi by his military or other opponents.

■ **Aug. 7:** Crisis Pre-Planning Group of officials from State, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Department and White House meet at White House to endorse overall plan outlined in original State Department memo.

■ **Aug. 12:** Reagan gets three-page memo from Adm. John M. Poindexter, his national security affairs adviser, summarizing a proposed program of disinformation against Libya.

■ **Aug. 14:** Reagan meets with Cabinet-level National Security Planning Group and approves the program as outlined by Poindexter.

■ **Aug. 25:** The Wall Street Journal reports that the United States and Libya are on a "collision course" and that U.S. military action against Libya is impending.

■ **Aug. 26:** White House spokesman Larry Speakes describes the Journal report as "authoritative" and major television networks and newspapers report stories similar to the Journal account.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1370544-000

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Page 4 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 7 ~ Duplicate;
Page 8 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 10 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 11 ~ Duplicate;
Page 12 ~ Duplicate;
Page 13 ~ Duplicate;
Page 14 ~ Referral/Consult;
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FD-36 (Rev. 8-26-82)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:
- ☐ Teletype
- ☐ Facsimile
- ☐ _____

PRECEDENCE:
- ☐ Immediate
- ☐ Priority
- ☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
- ☐ TOP SECRET
- ☐ SECRET
- ☑ CONFIDENTIAL
- ☐ UNCLAS E F T O
- ☐ UNCLAS

Date 2/06/87

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, [redacted] (P) (C-3)

UNSUB(S);
UDCI IN THE WASHINGTON POST,
OCTOBER 2, 1986, IN AN ARTICLE BY
[redacted] ENTITLED, "GADHAFI
TARGET OF SECRET U.S. DECEPTION PLAN";
ESPIONAGE-X;
OO:Bureau

~~SECRET~~

This communication is classified ~~"SECRET"~~ in its entirety.

Re WFO airtel to Bureau, October 30, 1986, and LHM, dated October 29, 1986, WFO airtel dated December 18, 1986.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and five copies of a LHM pertaining to the captioned matter.

LEAD:

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Investigation continuing.

~~SECRET~~
~~Classified by: C-3~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

2 - Bureau (Enc. 6)

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[redacted]

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Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)

[redacted]

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
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[redacted]

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

FD-336 (Rev. 10-26-79)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT

of the

LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

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YOUR FILE NO. [redacted] (C-3)(P) 2/11/87
FBI FILE NO.
LATENT CASE NO. C-62000

TO: SAC, WFO

RE: UNSUB(S);
UDCI IN THE WASHINGTON POST
OCTOBER 2, 1986 ENTITLED
"GADHAFI TARGET OF SECRET U.S. DECEPTION PLAN"
BY [redacted]
ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK)

REFERENCE: Airtel 12/18/86
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: WFO
SPECIMENS: Ten documents
Map

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Eighty-one latent fingerprints (seven are of tip, side or lower joint areas), six latent palm prints and one latent impression (lower joint area of a finger or a palm print) of value were developed on nine documents. No latent prints of vaue were developed on "LAB DOC #9," or the map.

Sixty latent fingerprints developed on eight documents, described as follows, have been identified as fingerprints of [redacted] born [redacted]

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Five on "LAB DOC #1, a pink cover sheet, stamped 8/11/86, marked "Top Secret/Codeword," with attached memorandum dated 8/11/86 and National Security Group paper
Sixteen on "LAB DOC #2," a memorandum dated 8/12/86, marked "Top Secret/Sensitive," with attached memorandum, agenda, list of participants, talking points, and two discussion papers

(Continued on next page)

~~Classified by: G-3~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

SEARCHED [redacted] INDEXED [redacted]
SERIALIZED [redacted] FILED [redacted]
FEB 17 1987
[redacted]

COPY TO [redacted]

SAC, WFO 2/11/87

Ten on "LAB DOC #3," a memorandum marked "Top Secret/ Codeword," with attached memorandum and discussion paper
One on "LAB DOC #4," a memorandum dated 8/12/86, marked "Top Secret/Sensitive," with attached memorandum, agenda, list of participants, talking points, and two discussion papers
Nine on "LAB DOC #5," a memorandum dated 8/6/86, marked "Top Secret/Codeword," with attached Crisis Pre-planning Group paper
Seven on "LAB DOC #6," a memorandum dated 8/12/86, marked "Top Secret/Sensitive," with attached memorandum, agenda, list of participants, talking points, and two discussion papers
Eleven on "LAB DOC #7," a memorandum dated 8/6/86, marked "Top Secret/Codeword," with attached CPPG paper
One on "LAB DOC #8," an access log dated 8/5/86, marked "Top Secret/Codeword," with attached CPPG paper

One latent fingerprint developed on "LAB DOC #5," has been identified as an elimination fingerprint of SA [redacted]

Thirteen latent fingerprints are not fingerprints of [redacted] OR [redacted] The remaining latent fingerprints and the latent impression were compared with the available fingerprints of these individuals, but no identification was effected. Inked impressions of the tip, side and lower joint areas of the fingers, as well as palm prints, are needed for conclusive comparisons. b6 b7C

Based on the information furnished, no fingerprint records were located in the Identification Division files for [redacted] or [redacted]

The specimens are being returned under separate cover.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-23-2025 BY [redacted] ADG

FD-302 b6 b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/21/87

1

[redacted] of the Logistics Management Institute (LMI), 4875 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia, [redacted] was interviewed and voluntarily provided the following information:

She advised that she has not met with [redacted] since October 8, 1986, the date that she [redacted] was first interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, they have talked to each other telephonically several times since that date. [redacted] called her shortly after October 8, 1986 at which time [redacted] mentioned the FBI investigation regarding her association with [redacted] talked about different scenarios in which National Security Council (NSC) information could have been passed to [redacted] specifically recalled that [redacted] said that any NSC staffer could have accessed her computer and retrieved the information that was leaked. b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that during her first conversation with [redacted] after October 8, 1986 she told [redacted] that she had been interviewed by the FBI regarding her knowledge of [redacted] association with [redacted] asked her what questions the FBI asked and how she answered the questions. [redacted] said she told [redacted] everything about the interview. Although [redacted] had called to set up a time for them to get together, [redacted] changed her mind and said that it would be better for [redacted] if they were not seen together. b6 b7C

She advised that she last talked to [redacted] about two or three weeks ago. [redacted] is still very concerned about what people think of her and her relationship with [redacted] still maintains that she did not provide [redacted] with any classified information. [redacted] stated that [redacted] has never mentioned anything to her that would indicate that [redacted] had in fact passed classified information to [redacted]

Investigation on 5/20/87 at Alexandria, VA. File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 5/20/87 b3 b6 b7C b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside of your agency.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-23-2025 BY [redacted] ADG

F2- [redacted]
[redacted] CASE NO: [redacted] MAIN-REF: R RACE: U SEX: M
INDEXED: 052788 NAME TYPE: EVENT DATE: DOB: [redacted]
F3- [redacted]
CASE NO: [redacted] MAIN-REF: R RACE: U SEX: M
INDEXED: 032487 NAME TYPE: EVENT DATE: DOB: [redacted]
F4- [redacted] UPSHUR
CASE NO: [redacted] MAIN-REF: R RACE: U SEX: M
INDEXED: 052987 NAME TYPE: EVENT DATE: DOB: [redacted]
F5- [redacted] DEAN
CASE NO: [redacted] MAIN-REF: M RACE: U SEX: U
INDEXED: 122287 NAME TYPE: EVENT DATE: DOB:
F6- [redacted] DEAN
CASE NO: [redacted] MAIN-REF: R RACE: U SEX: M
INDEXED: 021888 NAME TYPE: EVENT DATE: DOB:
F7- [redacted]
CASE NO: 183- 0000072-P MAIN-REF: R RACE: U SEX: U
INDEXED: 061086 NAME TYPE: EVENT DATE: DOB:
F8- [redacted]
CASE NO: 183- 0000072-P MAIN-REF: R RACE: U SEX: U
INDEXED: 060986 NAME TYPE: EVENT DATE: DOB:
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F1 - REQUERY F9 - QUERY AX SHIFT-F10 - RETURN TO FOIMS MENU
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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

AIRTEL

5/26/87

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: SSA [redacted] TERRORISM SECTION, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

FROM: SAC, [redacted](RUC)(C-3)

~~S E C R E T~~

UNSUB(S);
UDCI IN THE WASHINGTON POST,
OCTOBER 2, 1986, IN AN ARTICLE BY
[redacted] ENTITLED, "GADHAFI
TARGET OF SECRET U.S. DECEPTION PLAN";
ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK);
OO:FBIHQ

This entire communication is classified ~~"SECRET"~~.

Re WFO airtel and Letterhead Memorandum (LHM), dated 2/6/87, and WFO airtel, dated 12/18/86.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and five (5) copies of an LHM regarding the captioned matter.

Circumstantial evidence developed in this matter has identified [redacted] as a suspect. However, no direct evidence was developed showing that [redacted] actually provided [redacted] with classified National Security Council (NSC) documents that resulted in [redacted] writing the article in question. Furthermore, no evidence was developed showing that [redacted] verbally apprised [redacted] of the contents of classified NSC documents with the purpose on [redacted] part to damage the national security of the United States. In view of these facts, WFO considers this ~~matter~~ RUC.

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~~S E C R E T~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY: G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

3-Bureau (Enc. 6)
1-Washington Field Office
[redacted]

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5/28/87 5/29/87 5/29/87 (5)

[redacted]

Searched.....
Serialized.....
Indexed.....
Filed.....

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-23-2025 BY: [redacted]

C-3

INBOX.3 (#1540)

TEXT:

VZCZCHQ0142

PP SL WF

DE HQ #0142 2101114

ZNY SSSSS

P 281940Z JUL 87

FM ACTING DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI ST. LOUIS PRIORITY

FBI [redacted] PRIORITY

BT

~~S E C R E T~~

UNSUB(S); UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "CIA ANTI - QADDAFI PLAN BACKED. REAGAN AUTHORIZED COVERT OPERATION TO UNDERMINE LIBYAN REGIME" BY [redacted] IN "THE WASHINGTON POST" ON NOVEMBER 3, 1985; ESPIONAGE - X; (MEDIA LEAK) OO: FBIHQ

THIS COMMUNICATION CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~ IN ITS ENTIRETY.

REFERENCE FBIHQ TELCAL TO SSA [redacted] JULY 27, 1987.

INVESTIGATION BY WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE HAS DEVELOPED [redacted] AS BEING THE INDIVIDUAL WHO LEAKED THE INFORMATION IN CAPTIONED TITLE TO [redacted] OF "THE WASHINGTON POST" [redacted]

Jun 19 4 - 9M 107

ORIGINAL IN [redacted]

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[redacted] A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF [redacted] WAS RELIEVED OF HER DUTIES AT [redacted] AND THEREAFTER [redacted] A SUBSEQUENT LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS SEIZED FROM [redacted] OFFICE RESULTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELEVEN UNIDENTIFIED FINGERPRINTS.

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b7C

INVESTIGATION BY FBIHQ AND WFO TO LOCATE THE FINGERPRINTS OF [redacted] HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE THOUGH HE ALLEGEDLY SPENT [redacted]

ST. LOUIS IS REQUESTED TO IMMEDIATELY CONTACT PERSONNEL OF MILITARY RECORDS CENTER AND ASCERTAIN IF FINGERPRINT CARDS FOR [redacted] PDOB [redacted] AT [redacted] SSAN [redacted] CAN BE LOCATED. IF FINGERPRINT CARDS ARE LOCATED, IMMEDIATELY ADVISE FBIHQ, AND FURNISH THE CARDS TO FBIHQ LABORATORY DIVISION, LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION.

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~~C BY G-3; DECL: ON OADR.~~

BT

#0142

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ORIGINATING IN [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 07-23-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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Searched
Serialized [redacted]
Indexed
Filed [redacted]

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Searched [redacted]
Serialized [redacted]
Indexed [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 07-26-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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Searched
Serialized [redacted]
Indexed
Filed [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-26-2025 BY [redacted] ADC

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[redacted]

Searched [redacted]
Serialized
Indexed
Filed [redacted]